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Abstract
Purpose – Cybersecurity in healthcare has become an urgent matter in recent years due to various
malicious attacks on hospitals and other parts of the healthcare infrastructure. The purpose of this paper is to
provide an outline of how core values of the health systems, such as the principles of biomedical ethics, are in
a supportive or conﬂicting relation to cybersecurity.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper claims that it is possible to map the desiderata relevant to
cybersecurity onto the four principles of medical ethics, i.e. beneﬁcence, non-maleﬁcence, autonomy and
justice, and explore value conﬂicts in that way.
Findings – With respect to the question of how these principles should be balanced, there are reasons to
think that the priority of autonomy relative to beneﬁcence and non-maleﬁcence in contemporary medical
ethics could be extended to value conﬂicts in health-related cybersecurity.
Research limitations/implications – However, the tension between autonomy and justice, which
relates to the desideratum of usability of information and communication technology systems, cannot be
ignored even if one assumes that respect for autonomy should take priority over other moral concerns.
Originality/value – In terms of value conﬂicts, most discussions in healthcare deal with the conﬂict of
balancing efﬁciency and privacy given the sensible nature of health information. In this paper, the authors
provide a broader andmore detailed outline.
Keywords Ethics, Healthcare, Cybersecurity, Computer ethics, Bioethics, e-Health
Paper type Conceptual paper
1. Introduction
Recent global attacks such as the WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017 had
considerable effects on the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure
of many healthcare providers, indicating that cybersecurity in healthcare is rather
underdeveloped compared to other domains such as the ﬁnancial sector (ENISA, 2016).
What is the reason for this given that everybody agrees that health is an important value to
human beings and that health information is among the most sensitive information? We
suggest that one reason for this problem are the many values relevant for healthcare that are
often in a conﬂicting tension with the aim of cybersecurity, as shown in Figure 1. Although
one may claim that cybersecurity prevents damage from malicious attackers (i.e. supports
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non-maleﬁcence), enables the protection of privacy and in this way usually enables trust,
both moral (such as equality or care) and instrumental values (such as cost-effectiveness or
efﬁciency) can have a conﬂicting relation to cybersecurity. For example, cybersecurity
measures are costly and often effortful.
As an illustration, take the example of autonomy. When ICT is used in healthcare, it shall
be aimed at ensuring that patients themselves determine which information is revealed to
whom. Generally, password protection and encryption are common measures that are
maintained. However, in emergencies, when patients are no longer able to make this
decision, there is a risk that important medical information will not be accessible. Moreover,
it might be very helpful to widely share medically relevant patient information among
healthcare professionals to improve the quality and efﬁciency of treatment. Cybersecurity
can thus be both supportive for privacy (understood as an aspect of autonomy) and hinder
data sharing as a means for improving healthcare; therefore, it can be an obstacle to
beneﬁcence.
To analyze this problem, our contribution aims to answer two questions.
Q1. Which values are relevant for the ethics of cybersecurity in health?
Q2. What is the relation between the values at stake in cybersecurity and the four
principles of medical ethics?
The analysis we offer relies on a conceptualization involving three classes of concepts:
(1) the principles of medical ethics;
(2) desiderata of ICT in health; and
(3) the instrumental role of cybersecurity in facilitating or hindering the achievement
of each of these three desiderata.
We begin our analysis with the role of cybersecurity in healthcare by distinguishing
between three types of threats based on the target of the attack: threats against information,
information systems and medical devices. In a fundamental sense, however, all attacks can
be described as threats to the conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability of information
(Anderson, 1972; Voydock and Kent, 1983), including disrupting a system such that
information cannot be processed. These threats relate to four main functions of ICT systems:
improving the quality and efﬁciency of services, protecting conﬁdentiality, enhancing
usability and protecting patients’ safety. Finally, the tensions of these four desiderata to the
principles of biomedical ethics are explained (Figure 2). While this involves a huge
simpliﬁcation of the debate, it allows us to explain in a relatively simple manner the role of
Figure 1.
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cybersecurity. Our contribution is based on a review of 75 papers that were identiﬁed as
being relevant for ethics in cybersecurity regarding health (Yaghmaei et al., 2017).
2. Desiderata of information and communication technology and the
instrumental value of cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is not an end in itself but a precondition or means of other more general
functions of ICT in health. Hence, it might be possible to explain the value conﬂicts in
cybersecurity by relating them to the most important desiderata of virtually all ICT
systems.We can distinguish between them as follows:
 quality and efﬁciency of services;
 privacy;
 usability; and
 safety.
2.1 First desideratum: eﬃciency and quality of services
If one agrees that health is an important value to human beings, then a healthcare system
that can provide effective and efﬁcient help in case of medical problems is most valuable. As
reported by Nancy Lorenzi (2005, p. 2), currently:
[a]lmost every major economy in the world experiences the eﬀects of the high cost of health
care, and many, if not most, national and regional governments are in some stage of healthcare
reform.
In fact, it can be said that in many countries, the reform of the healthcare system has
developed into a permanent state. The development and implementation of ICT to support
the provision of healthcare services is often a major part of these reforms. One of the main
purposes of ICT systems in healthcare is the administration of information about patients
and treatments to increase the efﬁciency of the healthcare system and, at the same time, to
reduce its costs.
Quality, which is distinct from efﬁciency, refers to improvements in healthcare of
qualitative and not quantitative nature. It refers, for example, to radically new services, as
Figure 2.
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opposed to deliver more of the same kind of services, with the same resources. For instance,
the collection and sharing of as much health-related data as possible could be used to
identify new information about diseases and possible treatments and would thus enable
innovations in healthcare (Olvingson et al., 2002; Vayena et al., 2016). Genomic research is
especially seen as a promising approach to bring about progress in public health (Caulﬁeld
et al., 2008); it could even be argued that participating in biobanks is an act of solidarity
(Hens et al., 2011; Hoedemaekers et al., 2007).
2.2 Second desideratum: privacy
McClanahan (2007, p. 69) stresses that:
[t]he increased use of electronic medical records has created a substantial tension between two
desirable values: the increased quality and utility of patient medical records and the protection of
the privacy of the information they contain.
Privacy is an important desideratum of services in the medical domain. Privacy
includes both individual privacy, the ability to control information about the self
(Westin, 1967; Fried, 1970), and group privacy (Bloustein, 2003), which protects “the
desire and need of people to come together, to exchange information, share feelings,
make plans and act in concert to attain their objectives” (Bloustein, 2003, p. 124),
particularly the exchange of information between patients and their physicians and
other caregivers.
Protecting “conﬁdentiality”, i.e. preventing unauthorized information gain, is one of the
main goals of cybersecurity (Anderson, 1972; Voydock and Kent, 1983). Conﬁdentiality in
the cybersecurity sense can be understood as a means to protect the privacy of both
individuals and groups.
2.3 Third desideratum: usability
ICT is designed to afford usability: “[T]he degree of effectiveness, efﬁciency, and
satisfaction with which users of a system can realize their intended task” (Roman et al.,
2017, p. 70). Depending on the function of the ICT item in question, users can be patients,
health workers and professionals, administrators or a combination of these. Persons in
all three of these categories have different degrees of ICT competences, depending on
personal attitudes and socio-demographic variables (e.g. education and age) or
individual capabilities, and their limitations, e.g. handicapped persons. Hence, ICT that
has a high degree of usability for most people in a given demographics may have a poor
degree of usability in a different demographics (Kaplan and Litewka, 2008). Usability is
not entirely independent of quality and efﬁciency. Low usability can compromise
quality and efﬁciency directly, e.g. when it leads to human errors or a slowing down of
the processes. While it may be difﬁcult to consider quality independently of usability,
one can imagine usability as a ﬁlter that limits access to more intrinsic qualities of a
service in different degrees for different kinds of users. Users who are more willing to
invest time in learning how to use a service may have access to a quality that is
inaccessible to other users.
2.4 Fourth desideratum: safety
For the sake of this study, safety can be deﬁned as the reduction of health-threatening
risk and risks to persons’ health. Security in cybersecurity typically refers to the
protection conferred to an entity against deliberate attacks, i.e. human causes involving
malicious goals. It is clear that the security of data, information systems and devices is
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necessary to protect the health of the patients that depend on them. Thus, security (as in
cybersecurity) can be considered a means to safety as deﬁned here. Safety can be
distinguished from quality, in that, for example, an ICT system (e.g. an implanted drug
delivery system) can both enable therapies of higher quality and expose the individual to
new risks, e.g. in the event of a cyberattack. Usability is not entirely independent of
safety. Low usability can compromise safety, quality and efﬁciency directly, e.g. when it
leads to human errors.
It may be objected that conﬁdentiality, usability and safety are all aspects of the quality
of services. While this is certainly true, it is also possible to distinguish a narrower concept
of quality that concerns the primary function of a service and is, at least conceptually,
relatively independent from the other three desiderata. There could be improvements in the
quality of care or its cost-effectiveness achieved by ICT systems that are difﬁcult to use,
place privacy at risk and generate threats to patients’ safety in speciﬁc circumstances (e.g.
the subject is a valuable target for economic or political reasons). Hence, it is meaningful to
treat the four goals of ICT systems in questions as four distinct desiderata.
In Section 3, we therefore analyze the literature on cybersecurity in relation to the four
desiderata identiﬁed above.
3. Cybersecurity as a means to information and communication technology
desiderata
3.1 Quality and eﬃciency
First, cybersecurity is a means to protect personal information that is the prerequisite of the
functioning of ICT systems designed to enhance the quality and efﬁciency of healthcare
services. The majority of papers that we reviewed in detail are dealing with utilizing health-
related electronic information or, more precisely, storing, exchanging and using patients’
(big) data. As already mentioned above, the use of ICT in healthcare should support the
achievement of both economic and medical objectives. Utilizing health-related electronic
information efﬁciently requires electronic information databases such as electronic
healthcare records (EHR), which are increasingly implemented in health facilities. The major
advantage of these records, besides cost efﬁciency, is the fast and uncomplicated exchange
of health-related data between organizations (van der Linden et al., 2009; McGraw et al.,
2009) and members of different health-related professions like general practitioners, hospital
doctors, nurses or paramedics. The employment of electronic information is diverse: it plays,
for example, an important role in the emergency department (Ayatollahi et al., 2009) or in
connection with maternal and child health registries (Myhre et al., 2016). Furthermore,
electronic health information has a seemingly big impact on counseling and psychological
therapy (Barros-Bailey and Saunders, 2010; van Allen and Roberts, 2011; Kotsopoulou et al.,
2015). Until now, electronic patient records have mainly been used to store “traditional”
patient data such as patient’s identity and demographic characteristics, recent and distant
medical history, current medications, allergies and sensitivities, chronic conditions, contact
information or legal preferences. Genomic data cover whole genome sequencing
(Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, 2012), large-scale genetic data
sets (Wjst, 2010) and human biobanks (Cambon-Thomsen et al., 2007). Other data such as
geographic information (Olvingson et al., 2002) and geospatial data (Lane and Schur, 2010)
might also be used in the health domain, e.g. in public health and epidemiology. Biomedical
and biometric data provided by individuals and patients themselves and collected with apps
and smart devices (Vayena et al., 2016) also raise concerns with regard to protecting
personal information. The quality element, the potential for improvement of patients’ life
(Devillier, 2016; Kaplan and Litewka, 2008), is often mentioned.
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Some of the studies mention the security of technologies for telemedicine (Kaplan and
Litewka, 2008) and in support of an independent life at home, as in the so-called ambient
assisted living (AAL) systems (Ikonen and Kaasinen, 2008; Rothenpieler et al., 2011;
Spitalewsky et al., 2013). Demographic change and its impact on the age structure of society,
the availability of labor and the increase in healthcare costs will contribute to the future
availability and deployment of AAL systems. Other studies focus on mobile applications
such as personal health apps (e.g. Project HealthDeSign, Olmsted et al., 2015) and apps for
self-tracking one’s own body functions and behavior (e.g. sexual and reproductive activities,
Lupton, 2015), often referred to with the phrase “quantiﬁed self.”
3.2 Privacy
While the primary motivation to use ICT in healthcare comes from the possibility of
enhancing its quality and efﬁciency, the deployment of ICT in healthcare raises some ethical
concern. Many of the studies that we reviewed particularly address security and privacy
problems regarding EHR (i.e. Barrows and Clayton, 1996; Dong et al., 2012; Ozair et al., 2015;
Rahim et al., 2013; Stahl et al., 2014). Different approaches of how to deal with security and
privacy could be identiﬁed, such as solutions based on technology (for biometric
authentication, e.g. Rodrigues and Santos, 2013, and for secure systems, e.g. Xiao et al., 2008)
and ethical guidelines (i.e. Buckovich et al., 1999; The Academy of Medical Sciences, 2017).
Security issues, among other factors, could lead to another crucial issue that was mentioned
in 28 studies: the loss of control. The ﬁrst type of issue is related to concerns regarding
access control, which comprises everything from an unclear data access authorization (Dong
et al., 2012; Stahl et al., 2014) over lacking some control (Ikonen and Kaasinen, 2008; Motti
and Caine, 2015; Olmsted et al., 2015; Olvingson et al., 2002) to a complete loss of control with
regard to personal information (Barrows and Clayton, 1996; Caulﬁeld et al., 2008). The
consequence could be unauthorized access by others (Buckovich et al., 1999; Greenbaum
et al., 2011; Myhre et al., 2016), e.g. in a professional medical context (Ayatollahi et al., 2009;
Caldicott and Manning, 2013; McGraw et al., 2009; van Allen and Roberts, 2011; Wallace,
2015; Wang et al., 2013; Xiao et al., 2008). The other type is the loss of control over one’s own
data (Barrows and Clayton, 1996; Caulﬁeld et al., 2008; Mascalzoni et al., 2015). This is
noticeable regarding a lack of possibilities to manage one’s own data (Bourret and Pestana,
2015; Thilakanathan et al., 2016), a lack of control over the concrete use of data (Greenbaum
et al., 2011; Ienca and Haselager, 2016; Rodrigues and Santos, 2013; Vayena et al., 2016) and,
in the worst case, the risk of losing ownership of one’s own data (Kluge, 2011). This loss can
be a risk to the empowerment of patients (Bourret and Pestana, 2015).
The less security and control one has over one’s own data, the more urgent the
ethical issue of misuse of data becomes, as discussed on different levels in 41 studies. In
particular, data theft (i.e. Buckovich et al., 1999; Myhre et al., 2016; Ozair et al., 2015;
Thilakanathan et al., 2016) and thus identity theft (Rodrigues and Santos, 2013;
Rothenpieler et al., 2011) are crucial issues. However, the most important risks of
misuse of data are the disclosure of information (mentioned by 32 papers, i.e. McGraw
et al., 2009; Wjst, 2010) and a possible identiﬁcation via the data (mentioned by 14
studies, among others Lane and Schur, 2010; The Academy of Medical Sciences, 2017),
which may increase the risk of surveillance (Mulligan and Schneider, 2011; Ozair et al.,
2015; Rothenpieler et al., 2011). The stated issues seem to have at least some effect on
conﬁdentiality (21 studies outline conﬁdentiality and trust issues). On the one hand,
stakeholders show a lack of trust with regard to technologies (Rahim et al., 2013; Saigí-
Rubio et al., 2016) and security systems (Olvingson et al., 2002; Tieu et al., 2015). On the
other hand, trust in professionals and medical staff is also an issue (Ayatollahi et al.,
JICES
17,2
234
2009; Williams, 2008), and conﬁdentiality seems to be crucial (Caldicott and Manning,
2013; Wallace, 2015), especially in counseling settings (Barros-Bailey and Saunders,
2010; Kotsopoulou et al., 2015; van Allen and Roberts, 2011). It is generally possible to
(re-)identify people (e.g. their health status, relationship link, dispositions) based on
genetic information (i.e. Lowrance, 2006; Vayena et al., 2016; Wright et al., 2013) and to
commercialize this knowledge (Cambon-Thomsen et al., 2007; Lupton, 2015).
3.3 Safety
Six sources discuss the risk of hacking and other forms of attacks (Motti and Caine,
2015; Mulligan and Schneider, 2011; Tieu et al., 2015), which could directly affect the
physical and psychological safety of individuals (Camara et al., 2015; Ienca and
Haselager, 2016; Altawy and Youssef, 2016). In addition to trade-offs between quality/
efﬁciency vs privacy/conﬁdentiality, the design of implantable medical devices
illustrates better than other health-related ICT contexts the trade-offs of both former
desiderata against safety (Table I). The incorporation of more extended
communication and networking functions, known as telemetry, leads to improvements
in quality and cost-effectiveness, e.g. patients can move freely in their homes, while
healthcare providers can constantly monitor them (Camara et al., 2015; Altawy and
Youssef, 2016).
However, this is a “vulnerable communication channel,” which “makes it easier to attack
the device” and “could potentially allow an adversary to monitor and modify the implant
without necessarily being close to the victim” (Camara et al., 2015, pp. 272-273). This also
compromises quality of services with implications on safety, e.g. “if the information sent by
Table I.
Cybersecurity of
implantable medical
devices
Type of attacks
Representative IMD
types
Consequences (by IMD
type)
Technical trade-offs and
constraints
Impersonation
(adversary can send
commands, modify
message in transit to
IMD, or block them).
More speciﬁcally:
reprogramming
therapies on ICD
inducing a state of
shock to the patient
depleting the battery
and render the device
inoperative
Cardiac implanted
device!
Hearth failure,
tachycardia, bradycardia,
cardiac arrhythmia
Battery lifetime (quality)
Neurostimulator! Inappropriate stimulation,
failure to stimulate,
tremors and spasms,
neuronal effects
Answering time (quality)
Drug delivery system! Loss of pain reliefs, injury,
inappropriate dosage,
inappropriate timing
Accessibility in
emergency situations
(usability and safety),
emergency authentication
Cochlear implant! Deafness, background
noise, ringing, distraction
or confusion
Higher likelihood of errors
and necessity of
maintenance (quality)
Denial of service
attack: disable
therapies on ICD
Undergo a surgical
procedure to have the
IMD replaced
Passive adversary with
capability to listen to
the communications
between IMDs and
programmers
Breach of privacy Security
(as in cybersecurity) can
be considered a means to
safety deﬁned in this
sense
Sources: Camara et al. (2015); Altawy and Youssef (2016)
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the implant to the programmer is altered, the doctor might make a wrong decision” (Camara
et al., 2015, p. 273).
3.4 Usability
The analysis of the literature, particularly on electronic health records, telemedicine and
AAL technologies, highlights difﬁculties regarding usability (Roman et al., 2017; Kaplan
and Litewka, 2008; Spitalewsky et al., 2013; Young et al., 2014) and the importance of
acceptance of ICT systems by their users (Saigí-Rubio et al., 2016; Tieu et al., 2015). One
example of a usability issue is the aforementioned trade-off between the usability of an
implant outside a medical environment and its vulnerability to cybersecurity attacks.
Another one, again in the context of implantable devices, is the fact that authentication may
be problematic in emergency situations (Camara et al., 2015; Altawy and Youssef, 2016).
Because usability can differ for different demographics, there is a tight connection
between this desideratum and one of the outstanding ethical issues concerning ICT in
health, emerging from our review: the fact that vulnerable groups and those with
special needs must be taken into particular consideration. Because of the “digital
divide,” people who have little or no experience with the application of ICT can face
disadvantages regarding health-related services (Chang et al., 2004). This also applies
to people with limited health literacy (e.g. in case of use of online portals, Tieu et al.,
2015). The literature shows that the elderly form a group with special needs and
interests, which could present a barrier for the adoption of health-related technologies
(Devillier, 2016; Young et al., 2014). People with dementia, Alzheimer’s or other
cognitive handicaps present a special case (i.e. Batchelor et al., 2012).
3.5 Instrumental role of cybersecurity
Cybersecurity measures are a means to ensure the reliability of ICT, which is a key requisite
for the quality, efﬁciency and safety and privacy of health services. In 26 studies addressing
technical security issues in health contexts, difﬁculties concerning reliability of systems
(Ikonen and Kaasinen, 2008; Spitalewsky et al., 2013) and reliability of data (i.e. Ozair et al.,
2015) have been mentioned. Threats to data integrity are unauthorized modiﬁcation
(Barrows and Clayton, 1996; Stahl et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2013), manipulation (Kaplan and
Litewka, 2008; Kluge, 2011) or sabotage of data (Williams, 2008). Cybersecurity involves
trade-offs regarding quality of ICT, as shown by the literature on implantable medical
devices (Table I): encryption and authentication, e.g., slow down device response and
indicate higher energy consumption. The latter has implications on battery and thus device
life, which, in turn, has implications on cost-effectiveness and safety because surgery is
required to replace such devices.
Cybersecurity’s relation to usability is also multifaceted. On the one hand, cybersecurity
can be a hindrance to usability. This holds mainly for two reasons: for humans, adhering to
policies that are necessary to keep data, systems and devices secure, which normally takes
resources such as time and mental efforts (Tieu et al., 2015, related to dementia and
remembering passwords see Batchelor et al., 2012). Second, cybersecurity technologies tend
to reduce the immediacy with which the data, system or device can be used for its primary
function as shown by the example of authentication for implantable medical devices
(Camara et al., 2015; Altawy and Youssef, 2016).
On the other hand, poor usability can be an indirect cybersecurity threat. For
example (outside cybersecurity), aggressive warning messages in AAL lead users to
deactivate security messages (Rothenpieler et al., 2011). Similarly, in the cybersecurity
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context, when security is a hindrance to usability, it may backﬁre, e.g. users may look
for workarounds such as writing complex passwords on a post-it to easily access them.
Summing up, it seems that the four desiderata explored here, namely, quality and
efﬁciency of services, privacy, usability of health-related ICT systems and safety, are related
as in a pentalemma, where you cannot simultaneously advance all of them through
cybersecurity. For example, cybersecurity protects systems that produce, connect and make
large amounts of personal data accessible while ensuring their integrity and completeness.
This, however, makes privacy harder to protect. If cybersecurity also includes tools for
protecting privacy, they must reduce the information in the data or its accessibility. If one
wants to have both high-quality services and privacy protection, data should be accessible
for some and inaccessible for others, i.e. one needs authorization systems but these also
reduce usability.
4. Cybersecurity and principles of biomedical ethics
4.1 Four principles of biomedical ethics
The “Principles of Biomedical Ethics,” ﬁrst published in 1977 by Tom L. Beauchamp and
James F. Childress, is a classic text in biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013).
The core features of this principlism are to identify four moral principles (autonomy, non-
maleﬁcence, beneﬁcence and justice) pertinent to a particular moral situation and to use
speciﬁcation, balancing and (deductive) application to create a bridge between the moral
situation and the relevant principles.
Principlism is not undisputed in bioethics (Clouser and Gert, 1990; Hine, 2011).
Nevertheless, principlism remains highly inﬂuential among bioethicists and practitioners
(Reijers et al., 2017). Hence, we would like to use principlism as a starting point of our ethical
analysis concerning cybersecurity in health.
The four principles of biomedical ethics are respect for autonomy, non-maleﬁcence,
beneﬁcence and justice. Beauchamp and Childress’ deﬁnitions can be summarized as follows:
(1) Respect for autonomy involves the right for an individual (patient) to make his or
her own choice, particularly for medical decisions. It involves the right to be
informed about therapeutic and diagnostic options in an appropriate way.
(2) Non-maleﬁcence can be derived from the classic quote “above all, do no harm,” as
stated in the Hippocratic Oath. It involves the duty to make pertinent risk-beneﬁt
assessments and to minimize risks to patients (and others) because of medical
action (or omission).
(3) Beneﬁcence requires acting with the best interest of the other in mind. It reﬂects the
basic moral motivation of medical acting, namely, to improve the health status and
quality of life of your patient.
(4) Justice emphasizes fairness and equality among individuals. It requires going
beyond the mere interaction between individual patients and medical professionals
and taking a holistic point of view, particularly with respect to distributive justice
of scarce goods.
4.2 Relations between information and communication technology desiderata and the four
principles
Quality and efﬁciency are mostly related to beneﬁcence. A more cost-effective system can
potentially help more people. Quality improvements can help people who could not have
been helped in the past. Moreover, even if quality innovations may initially not be cost-
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effective, often they become more affordable with time and tend to augment the number of
persons helped and treated in the long term.
Safety is mostly related to non-maleﬁcence. Once ICT services promoting quality and
efﬁciency are in place, the failure to guarantee their reliability can lead to harming
individuals. Higher information processing or communication capabilities can domore harm
than more primitive systems with less capabilities, even if the former are potentially able to
confer greater beneﬁts (or the same beneﬁt to more people) than the latter.
Privacy is mostly related to autonomy and non-maleﬁcence. Some cybersecurity measures
are meant to guarantee the privacy of information and communication within healthcare.
Non-maleﬁcence is at stake because violations of privacy can cause reputational harm,
discrimination and all those other risks to which a blackmailed subject may expose him or
herself and those who depend on the subject’s decisions.
Moreover, privacy is a precondition of autonomy. The connection between privacy and
autonomy is more organic. It has been argued that privacy is essential for autonomy in the
sense of individuality (Bloustein, 2003, p. 42):
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and whose every need,
thought, desire, fancy or gratiﬁcation is subject to public scrutiny [. . .] merges with the mass. His
opinions, being public, tend never to be diﬀerent; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be
conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of
unique personal warmth and to become the feelings of every man. Such a being, although
sentient, is fungible; he is not an individual.
Usability is mostly related to justice, but it is also related to non-maleﬁcence and autonomy.
There is a complex relation between usability, justice and each of the other principles. A
system may enhance the autonomy of some users, those who are able to navigate a more
complex system and express their preferences through it, but it may at the same time reduce
the autonomy of health-illiterate or ICT-challenged ones. Moreover, poor usability may
compromise safety, for example, information in a medical implant may be harder to retrieve
in emergency situations. It may unequally affect the security of different populations in
different circumstances. A design choice that enhances the autonomy or safety of some of its
users while reducing that of others may be considered unjust because it distributes beneﬁts
unequally, especially if those negatively affected belong to vulnerable populations, which
are already in a situation of disadvantage.
5. Conﬂicts of moral principles in cybersecurity
Having explained the relation between ICT desiderata and the four principles of medical
ethics, it is now possible to map trade-offs between the goals of cybersecurity into conﬂicts
between the four principles of medical ethics.
5.1 Prioritizing beneﬁcence and autonomy at the expense of justice
Suppose that cybersecurity protections in healthcare are designed to optimize the quality
and efﬁciency of services and the privacy of information and conﬁdentiality of
communication, while sacriﬁcing usability and safety. As shown above, a system
maximizing the amount of data produced and analyzed could be responsive to the individual
privacy preferences of patients, thus enhancing their autonomy and allocating resources
efﬁciently, which may beneﬁt more people (beneﬁcence). But a system capable of achieving
this will tend to be quite complex and, as such, compromises usability for certain
demographics, in contrast or even contradiction to the justice principle.
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5.2 Prioritizing beneﬁcence and (informational self-determination) autonomy at the expense
of non-maleﬁcence
Consider again a highly networked, data-intensive information system in healthcare, which
is designed to beneﬁt people with better and more cost-effective services, while respecting
their autonomy. If the system involves complex, granular, stratiﬁed authorization systems,
requiring complex passwords, it may invite workarounds which undermine cybersecurity
defenses. This generates exposure to passive and active attackers, who may interfere with a
device or gain access to conﬁdential information, which is in conﬂict with the principle of
non-maleﬁcence. In relation to implantable medical devices, a system with extended
networking capabilities and privacy protections may reduce usability in critical situations
(authorization issues) and safety (e.g. battery life issues), which is also in tension with the
principle of non-maleﬁcence.
5.3 Prioritizing beneﬁcence, justice and non-maleﬁcence at the expense of autonomy and
non-maleﬁcence
Suppose that the quality and efﬁciency of services are optimized, together with usability and
sacriﬁcing privacy, e.g. a system that makes extensive use of electronic health records and
extensive surveillance of patients through data generated by medical devices with
good protection of data integrity and accessibility but poor protection for conﬁdentiality and
privacy. Such a design may comply with some aspects of the principle of beneﬁcence (data-
intensive services) and some aspects of non-maleﬁcence (increased patient surveillance), but
sacriﬁce autonomy (patient surveillance and privacy violations) and other aspects of non-
maleﬁcence (harmful privacy violations). Incidentally, such a design may be compatible
with justice only because it “levels down” privacy and autonomy.
5.4 Prioritizing non-maleﬁcence and (privacy-related) autonomy at the expense of beneﬁcence
and autonomy
Consider a system of medical health records optimized to promote privacy and safety. The
most extreme form of this would be a system minimizing data collection, data sharing,
communication and networking. Such a system may be able to avoid privacy breaches and
impersonation and denial of service attacks, thus avoiding device malfunctions. It would be
responsive to the principle of non-maleﬁcence and also of autonomy, i.e. it protects privacy,
which is crucial for autonomy.
Such a design, however, could not be used for providing data intensive services, which
may involve a sacriﬁce in quality and/or cost-effectiveness. This is contrary to the principle
of beneﬁcence. In the context of implantable medical devices, maximizing privacy and
safety leads to sacriﬁcing certain aspects of usability (e.g. no wireless monitoring) with
implications on autonomy.
5.5 Prioritizing for justice at the expense of autonomy and non-maleﬁcence
A design choice may promote quality and efﬁciency while equalizing safety and privacy for
different demographics. Consider an electronic health record with a relatively simple
authentication system and just one privacy setting for all. Complex authentication systems
would be avoided too. It may be more suitable for patients from certain demographics (e.g.
elderly or illiterate), who may actually gain autonomy because of a system that offers few
personalization options and is thus simple to use. Less sophisticated ICT users would also
be less tempted to ﬁnd workarounds to security systems, so the system may achieve a more
even level of security. The design may achieve a more equal distribution of beneﬁts because
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it would be easier for otherwise disadvantaged users to take advantage of it. Such a simple
system would be maximally compatible with justice, but it would be incompatible with
services that guarantee informational self-determination. It would also conﬂict with non-
maleﬁcence because it would feature weak authentication, which could put the privacy of
the most vulnerable individuals at risk.
6. Conclusion: How should one set priorities between conﬂicting principles?
The preceding analysis shows that trade-offs involved in design choices for cybersecurity
systems map into conﬂicts between the four principles of medical ethics. We use the concept
of a “conﬂict” to describe the fact that different principles (beneﬁcence, non-maleﬁcence,
autonomy and justice) point in different directions. We use the concept of a “trade-off” to
describe the extent to which a design choice can satisfy each principle. The above analysis
deals with the most extreme cases for the purpose of illustration. For example, the design
choice described in Section 5.1 tries to maximally satisfy the beneﬁcence and autonomy
principles, which leads to sacriﬁcing justice. Conversely, the design choice described in
Section 5.5 tries to maximally satisfy justice with a cost in terms of the degree to which
principles of autonomy and non-maleﬁcence are satisﬁed. As the design choices discussed in
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 show, the trade-off can also be between different ways of satisfying the
same principle. For example, the design in Section 5.3 fulﬁlls the principle of non-
maleﬁcence by enhancing patient surveillance but makes the patient vulnerable to another
kind of harm because of reduced privacy. The design in Section 5.4 fulﬁlls the autonomy
principle with respect to privacy (which is an enabler of autonomy) but not with respect to
usability (which is an enabler too). Of course, real-world choices do not have to be so extreme
because designers will try to partially accommodate all principles without fully sacriﬁcing
any of them. However, the trade-offs seem unavoidable.
Principlism does not provide priority rules for balancing the four principles when they
conﬂict. This is left to the individual wisdom of ethical decision-makers (e.g. physicians,
administrators) as no formula is given to make decisions. However, the departure from the
tradition of medical beneﬁcence and the “discovery” of patient autonomy is possibly the
most signiﬁcant evolution in medical ethics since at least the second half of 20th century
(Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, pp. 75-100). In this tradition, the emphasis is on being
respected as an autonomous individual, rather than on the (arguably more demanding)
conditions of being autonomous, involving actual independence and authenticity in the
subjects involved (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, pp. 7-8). It may be possible to ask whether
this idea of a priority of the principle of respect for autonomy, conceived in this way, is
normatively appropriate and whether it de facto represents a dominant view among experts
of this domain not only concerning the role of the patient vis-a-vis a physician but also of the
user of ICT in health vis-a-vis cybersecurity.
With reference to cybersecurity of personal data and information systems, respect for
autonomy may initially appear enhanced by a system that tries to optimize for quality/
efﬁciency and privacy/conﬁdentiality while sacriﬁcing usability and safety; however, this is
objectionable. Except in a formal sense, such design distributes the preconditions for
autonomy in a somewhat unequal way. This system will only enhance the autonomy of
some people, namely, those with the competences and abilities required to be able to use and
take advantage of such systems and protect themselves well against cybersecurity risks.
A system sacriﬁcing privacy tends to be incompatible with autonomy because it enables
privacy violations with negative impact on autonomy across a wide-range of social contexts.
Finally, a system sacriﬁcing quality and usability would also be problematic for autonomy,
e.g. consider implantable devices. A design that minimizes networking and communication
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capabilities may afford better protection of privacy (against eavesdroppers) and safety (against
life- or health-threatening manipulations or malfunctions). However, it will have to sacriﬁce
usability in a way that it reduces autonomy, e.g. in relation to the possibility for a patient to
leavemedical environments and have amore autonomous life outside.
We believe that additional research, both empirical and normative, is required to
determine if respect for autonomy should be given more importance than other principles
and whether this is in fact a tendency in the ﬁeld. Even if respect for autonomy is given more
importance, it may be questioned whether the principle of respect for autonomy enjoys the
same importance in “common morality” as it appears to have among practitioners of ethics
or policy-makers in the ﬁeld. It is yet another question whether this moral view is correct,
irrespective of its popularity. Finally, the analysis here suggests that it is important to
investigate aspects of autonomy that are not associated with privacy protection, but with
the usability of ICT in healthcare.
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